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One of the most uncertain areas of mediation law is the existence of a
federal mediation privilege.' Even though most state legislatures have adopted
some form of a mediation privilege, the federal courts have failed to mirror the
states' movement towards uniformity. 2 This federal unpredictability
undermines the ability of mediation to prosper as a successful alternative
dispute method.3
The uncertainty regarding future protection of parties' statements
contributes to this unpredictability. Parties cannot predict how their mediation
communications will be protected at the federal level, regardless of whether
or not their case begins at the state level. Without this assurance of protection,
parties will almost certainly be less willing to candidly participate in
settlement negotiations because they cannot be confident that their mediation
communications cannot later be used against them.' ' To correct this
unpredictability and promote mediation instead of litigation, the federal courts
must begin to uniformly recognize a federal mediation privilege.5
1 SARAH R. COLE, ET AL., I MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE §8.1 (Thomson
Reuters 2014); Judy Shopp, Mediation: Confidentiality and Privilege, Pa. B. Ass'n Q. (July
2010).
2 E.g., COLE, supra note 1, at §8.18 ("For example, federal district courts in Georgia,
California, and Pennsylvania have recognized a privilege.. .[t]he Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals has refused to do so. The Second, Fourth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals
have declined opportunities to decide the issue.").
'E.g., Ellen E. Deason, Predictable Mediation Confidentiality in the U.S. Federal
System, 17 01110 ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 239, 243 (2002).
4 Id. at 243. See also, ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GrvING IN (2011).
' See generally Deason, supra note 3 (strongly advocating for federal uniformity to
promote predictability); Marcia S. Cohen, The Mediation Privilege, Florida Bar Journal,
87 APR FLA. B.J. 14 (April 2013) (articulating four main advantages of a mediation
privilege; candor, fairness, privacy, and neutrality).
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Legal scholars have debated the vehicle that federal courts should use to
establish a consistent and predictable mediation privilege, to no avail.6 The
best solution is to look directly at the congressional intent accompanying the
drafting and enactment of the flexible evidence rule governing federal
privileges. In the Federal Rule of Evidence 501 ("Rule 501"), 7 Congress
instructed courts to adapt to society's evolving interests in promoting
confidentiality within certain relationships by interpreting Rule 501 "in light
of reason and experience" when recognizing new privileges.8 The rule's
congressional intent lays a strong foundation in support of establishing a
federal mediation privilege. Using this foundation, federal courts should then
look to the Supreme Court's landmark decision regarding common law
privileges under Rule 501, Jaffee v. Redmond.9
Federal courts should use their "reason and experience" to apply the
balancing test established by the Supreme Court in Jaffee v. Redmond to
recognize a federal common law mediation privilege because the interests
promoted by a mediation privilege greatly outweigh the need for probative
evidence.
Part II of this article reviews the evolution of the codification of the
evidence rules, first by examining the decision to create codified evidence
rules and then by exploring the specific congressional intent with drafting and
enacting Rule 501. Part 1H outlines the four factors established by the Supreme
Court in Jaffee v. Redmond and the weight given to each factor. Following this
discussion of the Supreme Court's balancing test is an analysis of each factor's
applicability to mediation and the corresponding interests served by the
existence of a federal mediation privilege. Part IV highlights the need for a
predictable federal mediation privilege by exploring the current
inconsistencies among federal court approaches to a common law privilege,
specifically within the context of labor disputes. Part V concludes with a
proposal for establishing a federal common law mediation privilege.
6 Alan Kirtley, Best of Both Worlds: Uniform Mediation Privilege Should Draw from
Both Absolute and Qualified Approaches, 5 No. 2 DisP. RESOL. MAG. 5 (Winter, 1998).
'Fed. R. Evid. 501.8 Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, S. REP. No. 93-1277. This standard of "reason
and experience" applies residually, when neither state law supplies the substantive rule of
decision nor does a federal statute require the court to look elsewhere.
'Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 2 (1996).
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II. DRAFTING AND ENACTING FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 501
Privileges proved to be the most controversial of the all the Federal Rules
of Evidence.' ° An evidentiary privilege promotes the interest in confidentiality
within a relationship, while the other evidence rules promote the interest in
judicial truth-seeking. " A privilege directly contravenes the truth-seeking
interest.' 2 By blocking the admissibility of certain testimony, a privilege goes
against the "fundamental maxim"' 3 of the public's right to every other
person's evidence.' 4 This delicate balance of opposing interests required a
unique approach to the application of Rule 501 that satisfied both the interest
in promoting confidentiality in certain relationships as well as the judicial
interest in truth-seeking.
The Supreme Court originally proposed nine specific privileges,"5 but
Congress rejected the list in favor of a flexible rule that allowed courts to
balance those competing interests and continue developing alongside an ever-
changing society.16 The 1975 Senate report accompanying the Rules indicates
that Rule 501 "should be understood as reflecting the view that the recognition
of a privilege based on a confidential relationship should be determined on a
0 Fed. R. Evid. 501. Rule 501 delayed the Rules' enactment for two years and half of
all complaints Congress received were about privileges.
" CHRISTOPHER W. BEHAN, EVIDENCE AND THE ADVOCATE: A CONTEXTUAL
APPROACH TO LEARNING EVIDENCE
616-620 (2012).
12 Congress preferred to "leave the door open to change." H.R. REP. No. 93-650
(House Committee on the Judiciary, 1973). In doing so, Congress did not intend to
explicitly disapprove of those nine individual privileges, but rather intended for the courts
to determine the merits of specific privileges. The common distinction between a privilege
and the other evidence rules is that a privilege promotes some extrinsic interest, rather than
the traditional judicial interests in admissibility. However, the better distinction is that a
privilege exempts its holder from their general duty to give all the testimony they are
capable of giving.
13 United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (quoting 8 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 2192 (3d ed. 1940)). See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709
(1974).
14 The general view of disfavoring evidentiary privileges is supported by this interest
in the equitable administration of justice through complete testimony.
15 Notes of Committee on the Judiciaty, supra note 8.
6 Congress preferred to "leave the door open to change." H.R. REP. No. 93-650
(House Committee on the Judiciary, !973). In doing so, Congress did not intend to
explicitly disapprove of those nine individual privileges, but rather intended for the courts
to determine the merits of specific privileges.
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case-by-case basis."' 7 Therefore, the Rule did not freeze the law pertaining to
privileges, but instead directed the federal courts to "continue the evolutionary
development of testimonial privileges."'" Congress's intent is manifested by
the final language in Rule 501, which states:
The common law-as interpreted by United States courts in
the light of reason and experience-governs a claim of
privilege unless any of the following provides otherwise:
* the United States Constitution;
* a federal statute; or
* rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.
But in a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a
claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of
decision.19
The amount of judicial discretion that Congress afforded to the federal
courts is qualified by the phrase "in the light of reason and experience."
20
Although somewhat ambiguous, it stresses the importance of flexibility among
the courts. Congress found support for the idea that the rule must be flexible
and capable of change as society evolved from the Supreme Court's oft-quoted
phrase, "the common law is not immutable but flexible, and by its own
principles adapts itself to varying conditions." 21 As outlined below, the
"varying conditions" reflect an evolving society and the continuously
changing interests that accompany a privilege.1
2
7Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, supra note 8, at 13.
18 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980). See also University of
Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990).
19 Fed. R. Evid. 501.
20 Id. Saying that "privileges shall continue to be developed by the courts of the United
States under a uniform standard applicable both in civil and criminal cases. That standard,
derived from Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, mandates the application
of the principles of the common law as interpreted by the courts of the United States, in
the light of reason and experience."
21 Wolfe v. United States, 291 U. S. 7, 12 (1934) (quoting Funk v. United States, 290
U.S. 371, 383 (1933)). See also Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 79 (1958) (changes
in privileges may be "dictated by reason and experience").
22 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8 (1996).
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III. THE FOUR-FACTORS FROM THE SUPREME COURT BALANCING TEST
IN JAFFEE V. REDMOND
A. The Paradox of the Supreme Court's Choice to Establish and Use
a Balancing Test for Recognizing New Privileges
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Jaffee v. Redmond because the
federal courts could not agree upon the psychotherapist privilege. The Court
recognized the problem of unpredictability that would result if lower courts
were permitted to use their own "reason and experience" to formulate different
balancing tests for recognizing privileges. The courts would create different
balancing tests with different factors, and the resulting recognized privileges
would be just as different. Even in factually similar contexts, courts could
potentially reach opposite decisions on whether to recognize a certain
privilege.
The Supreme Court intended to promote the "fundamental maxim"
associated with judicial truth-seeking and the right to every man's evidence by
creating a burden that a privilege must overcome in order to be worthy of
recognition.23 The Court summarized this burden by instructing courts to
recognize a privilege only if it "promotes sufficiently important interests to
outweigh the need for probative evidence."24 The Court then created a four-
factored balancing test to determine whether the privilege overcomes this
"burden."
Each factor in the Jaffee balancing test represents an interest that the
privilege either promotes or inhibits. First, the privilege must be necessary to
promote trust in a private and confidential relationship. 5 Second, in addition
to promoting that private interest, the privilege must also serve a public
interest. 26 These factors represent two different interests that are both
classified under "sufficiently important interests" because they are both
promoted by the recognition of the privilege. For this analysis, imagine the
combination of these two factors creates the left side of ajudicial scale. After
using "reason and experience" to consider the weight of those two factors,
courts must then consider the third factor.
23 Melanie Stephens Stone, Jaffee v. Redmond: The Supreme Court Adopts a Federal
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege and Extends the Scope to Encompass Licensed Social
Workers, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1284, 1289 (1997).
24 Jaffee, 518 U.S. I at9.
25 Id. at 10.
26 Id. at 11.
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The third factor represents the interest in complete and accurate probative
evidence in judicial proceedings by requiring that the potential loss of
evidence as a result of recognizing the privilege be no more than "modest."27
For this analysis, imagine the third factor creates the right side of a judicial
scale. The left and right sides of this judicial tipping scale fluctuate as societal
interests evolve and as courts give different weight to each of the factors,
depending upon the context. Courts must use their own "reason and
experience" to determine whether the left side of the scales sufficiently
outweighs the right side as to justify the recognition of the privilege. 8
The final factor represents an interest unlike the first three-the interest in
promoting predictability among the existing privileges at the state court level.
Courts must determine whether denying the federal privilege would frustrate
similar privileges that exist uniformly and consistently across the state level.
The following is an analysis of each of the four factors, first as originally
established by the Supreme Court and then applied to the context of mediation
to justify the recognition of a federal mediation privilege.
B. First Factor on the Left Side of the Judicial Scale: Private Interests
Promoted by the Proposed Federal Privilege
The Supreme Court first turned to the private interests associated with
recognizing a privilege by stating that the privilege must be "rooted in the
imperative need for confidence and trust" in confidential relationships. 29 A
privilege that is rooted in this need will assure parties that their statements are
confidential; creating an environment of trust and confidence in the
relationship's ability to be successful.
The private interests are those of the specific parties involved in the
confidential relationship and the success of their relationship is directly
affected by the existence of a privilege. Courts must analyze the relationship
to determine whether it requires trust and confidence to be successful. If the
proposed privilege sufficiently promotes an environment of trust in a private
relationship, courts should give this factor significant weight in favor of
recognizing the privilege.
2 7 Id. at 13.
8 Id.
29Id. at 10.
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1. Private Interests Promoted by Recognizing the Proposed
Psychotherapist-Patient Relationship in Jaffee v. Redmond
In Jaffee, the Supreme Court analyzed the nature and context of the
psychotherapist-patient relationship to determine whether private interests
were promoted by the proposed privilege for such communications.30 The
Court reasoned that honest communications, which are fostered by an
atmosphere of trust and the assurance of confidentiality, are necessary for the
patient's proper diagnosis and treatment.3" Both parties have private interests
in the success of the relationship. The psychotherapist has an interest in
making a correct diagnosis and in successfully treating the patient. The patient
also has those interests in proper treatment, but has an additional interest in
preventing any potentially embarrassing or personal information from
becoming public after the session has ended.32 These private interests are
shared by all individuals in a psychotherapist-patient relationship.
Without this privilege, the success and purpose of the relationship would
be undermined because of the lack of confidentiality. The patient may not
communicate honestly with the psychotherapist due to the risk of
embarrassing or personal information becoming public after the therapy
session has ended. The patient may lie or omit essential information, which
could cause the psychotherapist to unknowingly misdiagnose the patient. The
psychotherapist is then at risk for potential malpractice or liability. These
negative ripple effects of an improper diagnosis harm both parties. Courts
should consider both the positive and negative effects of the privilege to give
proper weight to the first factor.
2. Similar Private Interests Promoted by Recognizing a Federal
Mediation Privilege
Parties to a mediation have a similar interest in confidentiality and legal
scholars agree that confidentiality is essential to reaching settlements because
30 Id.
31 Id. Within Jaffee, the success of the psychotherapist-patient relationship "depends
upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank
and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears. Because of the sensitive
nature of the problems for which individuals consult psychotherapists, disclosure of
confidential communication made during counseling sessions may cause embarrassment
or disgrace. For this reason, the mere possibility of disclosure may impede disclosure of
the confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment."
32 Id.
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trust between parties promotes full disclosures and candid negotiations. The
disputing parties have a relationship with each other, and they each have a
relationship with the mediator. All three of these interwoven relationships
benefit from the existence of confidentiality within and after the mediation and
the same reasoning applies to the relationships between mediation parties and
their individual relationship with the mediator. 33 When disputing parties
genuinely trust that the negotiations are confidential, an atmosphere of trust
develops in the mediation. 34 This helps eliminate parties' fears that their
statements will later be used against them as evidence, allowing them to freely
participate in candid negotiations and make complete, honest disclosures.35
With a promise of confidentiality, a party may be more willing to accept a
different solution or make unfavorable concessions during a mediation
session, even if they would not have done so publicly.
More support for the necessity of "trust and confidence" in mediation
stems from the idea that mediation is often the parties' last opportunity to settle
their dispute in a mutually beneficial way.36 For example, imagine two parties
who have spent significant time and money and have repeatedly failed to reach
a settlement privately and without a mediator. The next phase for these parties
is almost certainly formal litigation, which will cost more time and money, as
well as add to the already overcrowded judicial docket. The parties'
opportunity to achieve a solution that is mutually beneficial also diminishes if
they are forced to proceed onto litigation. Mediation serves as a final, last
chance attempt for the parties to settle their dispute outside of costly litigation.
Instead of the mutual losses that are almost certain to result from litigation, the
two parties have the assistance of a mediator to attempt again to achieve
mutually beneficial solutions.37 This common scenario shows why a federal
33 Deason, supra note 3, at 26 (arguing that the designation of the privilege holder is
"more difficult than with privileges that protect confidential relationships with a trusted
advisor" because of the "complex flow of communications between adversarial parties,
and is distinguished by the participation of the mediator as a facilitator...").
3' Legal scholars generally agree about the advantages of confidentiality in mediation.
See COLE, supra note 1. See, e.g., Karin S. Hobbs, Mediation Confidentiality and
Enforceable Settlements: Deal or No Deal?, MEDIATE.COM: EVERYTHING MEDIATION
(January 2007), http://www.mediate.com/articles/hobbskl .cfm#.
" See also Confidentiality in Federal Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs, 65
Fed. Reg. 83,085 (Fed. Alt. Dispute Council Dec. 29, 2000) ("[G]uarantees of
confidentiality allow parties to freely engage in candid, informal discussions of their
interests in order to reach the best possible settlement of their claims. A promise of
confidentiality allows parties to speak openly without fear that statements made during an
ADR process will be used against them later.").
36 See generally FISHER & URY, supra note 4.
37 Id.
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mediation privilege would promote the private interests in reaching a
settlement.
The drafters of the Uniform Mediation Act reiterate the need for
confidentiality. The Prefatory Note of the Uniform Mediation Act solidifies
the connection between assured confidentiality and honest communications
among mediation participants.38 It argues that only when the parties believe
that their mediation communications will not later hurt them in subsequent
court proceedings, will they participate in those communications with
complete candor and disclosure.3 9
Similar to the reasoning in Jaffee, strong support for the private interests
promoted by the privilege can be found by reviewing the potential negative
implications if the proposed privilege was denied. Without the assurance of
mediation confidentiality, parties have no incentive or ability to form the
necessary atmosphere of trust and confidence.4" Parties may not fully disclose
important information or may not negotiate honestly out of fear that their
disclosures may be used as evidence against them in subsequent court
proceedings. Any lack of honest participation derails a potential settlement
because negotiations are futile when parties withhold essential information.
Therefore, to promote the private interest in reaching a settlement, a mediation
privilege is necessary. The first factor of the balancing test is firmly
established.4
C. Second Factor on the Left Side of the Judicial Scale: Public
Interests Promoted by the Proposed Federal Privilege
In addition to promoting a private interest, a privilege must also serve a
public interest.42 In Jaffee, the Supreme Court determined that the public also
38 Uniform Mediation Act and Official Comments, 2003 J. DisP. REs. 1, 7 (2003)
("[F]rank exchange can be achieved only if the participants know that what is said in the
mediation will not be used to their detriment through later court proceedings and other
adjudicatory processes.").
39 Id.
' Deason, supra note 3, at 240 (explaining that parties' perception of confidentiality
is "axiomatic" in the mediation process).
41 See e.g., American Journal of Mediation, The Path Toward a Federal Mediation





42 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996).
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benefits from a successful psychotherapist-patient relationship.43 The Seventh
Circuit addressed the other federal decisions that had rejected the privilege,
noting that they were more than five years old and that the "need and demand
for counseling services has skyrocketed during the past several years." 44 The
public certainly has an interest in the successful treatment of mental health
disorders and associated issues.
The Supreme Court found support for the public interest in their previous
opinions that addressed the spousal and attorney-client privilege. 4' The
attorney-client privilege encourages "full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients and thereby promotes broader public interests in the
observance of law and administration of justice."46 In a similar vein, the
spousal privilege "furthers the important public interest in marital harmony."47
Both privileges had been previously established using a similar balancing test,
although they were in contexts different than the medical relationship in Jaffee.
The Supreme Court explained that the public interest served by the
psychotherapist privilege was of great importance; the psychotherapist
privilege promotes "appropriate treatment for individuals suffering the effects
of a mental or emotional problem. The mental health of our citizenry, no less
than its physical health, is a public good of transcendent importance. '48 The
second factor was firmly established, and the reasoning used by the court
directly applies to a federal mediation privilege.
A recognized federal mediation privilege would promote public
confidence in the success of mediation as an alternative dispute resolution
method, which would then likely increase the voluntary use of mediation as a
dispute resolution method. This positive public perception would also serve
the public's interest in decreasing court dockets and the associated costs. 4 9 The
UMA Prefatory Note articulates this argument by stating: "Public confidence
in and the voluntary use of mediation can be expected to expand if people have
confidence that the mediator will not take sides or disclose their statements,
particularly in the context of other investigations or judicial processes.
''
4" Id. The Court noted that if no privilege existed for psychotherapist-patient
communications, the public would be deterred from seeking treatment for mental illness.
Id. at 9 (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1355-1356 (7th Cir. 1995).
15 See e.g. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
46 Id
17 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980). See also United States. v.
Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 705 (1974); Wolfle v. United States, 291 U. S. 7, 14 (1934).48 Jaffee, 518 U.S. 1 at 11.
"9 Wayne D. Brazil, Court ADR 25 Years After Pound: Have We Found a Better
Way, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISPUTE RESOL. 93, 118-48 (2002).
50 UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, prefatory note (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS OF UNIF.
STATE LAWS 2003).
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One of the UMA's primary purposes was to promote this public interest
by encouraging a "full disclosure of facts to the mediator by all parties and
helps bring a higher level of success and party satisfaction to all mediations.
Achieving a higher level of success will promote greater community
confidence in the mediation process which should result in more disputes
being resolved by mediation." 51 Parties may also provide incomplete
information during mediation if they believe that mediation is not to be taken
seriously, which undermines the overall success of mediation as an alternative
dispute resolution method.52 Legal scholars agree that public support of the
mediation process increases when parties are assured that their mediation
statements will be protected and remain confidential.53
Without this positive public perception of the probabilities of successful
mediation, parties may not use mediation to settle their disputes, leading to
lengthy and expensive court dockets and slower judicial processes.54 Without
the assurance. of confidentiality, parties may be hesitant to use mediation, and
court dockets would thus not decrease because of the difficulty in encouraging
settlements. 5 Instead, parties may turn to litigation or believe that any
settlement achieved through mediation is non-binding. Both of these results
negatively affect the courts' ability to enforce judgments, keep judicial costs
low, and maintain their overall judicial integrity.56 A mediation privilege is
necessary to promote the public interest in the increased use of mediation and,
therefore, the second factor is more than sufficiently established.
D. Only Factor on the Right Side of the Judicial Scale: Loss of
Evidence Due to the Proposed Federal Privilege Must Not Exceed
"Modest"
The first two factors represent the private and public interests promoted
by recognizing the privilege. The third factor represents a conflicting interest
that is inhibited by the privilege.57 The judicial interest in truth-seeking is
51 Id
52 See generally FIS-ER & URY, supra note 4.
53 See Deason, supra note 3, at 240.
14 Id.; Eric Green, A Heretical View of the Mediation Privilege, 2 OHIO ST. J ON
DIsP. RESOL. 1, 2 (1986).
" See Deason, supra note 3, at 240; Green, supra note 54, at 2.
56 Stuart M. Widman, The Protections and Limits of Confidentiality in Mediation, 24
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 167, 170 (2006).
" Walter V. Stafford, Evidentiary Privileges in the Federal Court, 52 CAL L. REV.
3 (1964).
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promoted instead by the denial of the privilege. 8 The third factor in the Jaffee
balancing test promotes the earlier stated "fundamental maxim" by requiring
that any loss of evidence as a result of the privilege be no more than
"modest."59 By weighing the third factor against the first two factors, federal
courts can determine whether a privilege should be recognized from a policy
standpoint before turning to the final Jaffee factor.
The Supreme Court recognized the general duty of every citizen to give
all of the testimony they are capable of giving. 6 The majority further
addressed the common law principles underlying the recognition of
testimonial privileges by stating:
For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a
fundamental maxim that the public.. .has a right to every
man's evidence. When we come to examine the various claims
of exemption, we start with the primary assumption that there
is a general duty to give what testimony one is capable of
giving, and that any exemptions which may exist are
distinctly exceptional, being so many derogations from a
positive general rule.6
The Court explicitly stated that the interest in judicial truth-seeking is
assumed to exist through this general duty.62 Therefore, any exception must be
distinct and exceptional as to justify defying this interest.
Scalia's dissent in Jaffee vigorously advocates against the privilege
because of resulting "occasional injustice."63 He clarifies the third factor by
explaining that the courts have a "duty to proceed cautiously when erecting
barriers between us and the truth."'64 A privilege creates this "barrier" because
it inhibits, to some extent, the judicial duty of accurate fact-finding.
Scalia acknowledges that the first two factors are easily met, and that the
court avoids meeting the high standard for rules that are "in derogation of the
search for truth."' Scalia then argues that stating those values do not answer
58 Id.
" Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996).
60 Id. at 9.
61 United States. v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (quoting 8 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 2192 (3d ed. 1940)). See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709
(1974).
62 Bryan, 339 U.S. at 331.
63 Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
64Id. at21.
6 5
1d. at 22 (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710).
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the critical question at hand in the case, which is the question of whether those
public and private interests are of such importance as to justify making the
federal courts susceptible to occasional injustice.6'
The importance that the court places on this interest is seen in another
context by comparing the Jaffee decision to a later Supreme Court decision
that resulted in the opposite outcome.6 7 The context in which the Supreme
Court denied the privilege is vastly different than in Jaffee, which
demonstrates the heavy burden required to overcome the "fundamental
maxim" of evidence admissibility.
In University of Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, a university refused to disclose and submit tenure documents to
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, claiming that the documents
were privileged and confidential and, therefore, inadmissible. 68 These
documents related to multiple accusations of sexual and racial discrimination
against a tenured professor. 69 The Supreme Court disagreed with the
university and used the four Jaffee factors to justify denying their proposed
privilege.7°
In the unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court reasoned that the need for
valuable evidence in discrimination allegations outweighed the interests
promoted by the privilege and that the "costs associated with racial and sexual
discrimination in institutions of higher learning" outweighed confidentiality's
"importan[ce] to the proper function of the peer review process.", 71 This
opinion shows the difference in weight given to the third factor, depending
upon the specific claim or cause of action that the evidence is being offered to
prove. The Court recognized the psychotherapist-patient privilege, 72 but
denied a privilege for documents relevant to racial and sexual discrimination
charges. 73 The Court used the Jaffee balancing test in both cases to come to
different conclusions, and lower courts should follow this example and use the
Jaffee balancing test to recognize a federal common law mediation privilege.
In the context of a mediation privilege, the loss of evidence as a result of
a mediation privilege is likely to be no more than "modest."74 The Supreme
66 Id.
67 Univ. of Pa. v. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
68 Id. at 182.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 193.
72 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1,2 (1996).
71 Univ. of Pa., 493 U.S. at 189.
7' Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 216 F.3d 1082, 1082 (9th
Cir. 2000).
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Court noted that any party's loss-of-evidence argument is somewhat weak
because without the existence of a privilege, the evidence may have never
existed at all. 7 In other words, information that is disclosed for the first time
in a mediation may otherwise not have been disclosed at all.76 It would seem
that the court concluded that the burden of determining how to discover the
information otherwise is not an unacceptable burden of production.
Some courts have speculated that a mediation privilege may permit
disputing parties to "disobey court orders or otherwise violate ethical rules"
without any risk of punishment.77 Those courts concluded that the increased
risk of mediator misconduct, attorney malpractice, or unauthorized practice of
law outweighs the interests benefited by a mediation privilege.7 8 Certainly,
unpunished professional misconduct jeopardizes the integrity of mediation
and the entire judicial system, and would also create a negative public
perception of the seriousness and success abilities of mediation.
There are four general categories of situations in which a mediation
privilege would likely be outweighed by the need for evidence: (1) for the use
in criminal proceedings, (2) to prove coercion or fraud that led to the mediated
settlement, (3) to establish the terms of an agreement, and (4) to impose
sanctions or disciplinarily actions on counsel for their actions during the
mediation.79 These situations are addressed by the UMA and offer insight into
potential exceptions that federal courts could enact for the common law
mediation privilege. However, the UMA's privilege exceptions address these
71 Univ. of Pa., 493 U.S. at 67.
76 Sheldone v. Pa. Tpk. Comm'n, 104 F. Supp. 2d 511, 514 (W.D. Pa. 2000).
" Nielsen-Allen v. Indus. Maint. Corp., No. Civ. 2001/70 FR, 2004 WL 502567, at
*2 (D.V.1. Jan. 8, 2004) (Reasoning that "[a]pplying the cloak of mediation to the facts of
this matter appears inequitable to [the defendant] who negotiated settlement of [this action)
and applied confidentiality thereto for the express purpose of avoiding having such
settlement amount established as a benchmark in future similar employment cases. Such
result highlights the need for exceptions to mediation confidentiality." The court refused
sanction counsel for an alleged wrongful disclosure of a settlement amount.). But see Reda
v. Globalist Internet Technologies, Inc., No. G039232, 2008 WL 2656147, at *3-4 (Cal.
4th Dist. Ct. App. July 8, 2008) (excluded attorney testimony regarding the events of a
mediation, reasoning that the statute did not contain explicit language permitting the
testimony, and rejecting the argument that no purpose is served by a mediation privilege
when the witness is lying about events that occurred during a mediation).
78 Reda, 2008 WL 2656147, at *3. But see Wimsatt v. Superior Court, 152 Cal. App.
4th 137, 163 (Cal. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (refusing to recognize an exception for legal
misconduct, observing that "when clients.. .participate in mediation they are, in effect,
relinquishing all claims for new and independent torts arising from mediation, including
legal malpractice causes of action against their own counsel").
7 See generally Widman, supra note 56.
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fears by waiving the privilege in certain contexts."0 For example, there is no
privilege when certain evidence is otherwise indiscoverable and is essential to
prevent a "manifest injustice.""1
When balancing the third factor against the first two factors, federal courts
should conclude that recognizing a mediation privilege is justified. The fourth
factor in the Jaffee balancing test exists separately and forces courts to
determine whether the interest in state and federal predictability will be
inhibited if the federal privilege is denied.
E. Final Factor Not Placed on the Judicial Scale: Frustration of State
Uniformity if the Proposed Federal Privilege is Denied
The first three Jaffee factors could exist, theoretically, regardless of
whether the privilege was being considered at the state level or federal level
because those three factors represent the general interests involved in
recognizing a privilege. The fourth factor is specific to the existence of a
federal privilege. It requires federal courts to establish that similar state
privileges would not be frustrated by their refusal to recognize the proffered
privilege.82 The fourth factor promotes the interest in predictability both
vertically and horizontally.
If a court determines that the right side of the scale outweighs the left, and
therefore a privilege should not be recognized, the court must then proceed to
account for the fourth factor and make an additional determination as to
whether the privilege should still not be recognized. If a court determines that
the left side of the scale outweighs the right and therefore a privilege should
be recognized, there is no need to analyze the fourth factor because the court
has already determined that there will be no denial of the federal privilege. For
this reason, the fourth factor is not placed directly on the opposite scales, but
is rather an additional interest that must be accounted for after a court decides
that the right side outweighs the left. This added final inquiry emphasizes the
80 UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, supra note 50, at §6(a)(1)-(7). See, e.g., Ohio R.C. §
2710.05(B)(1). Section language states: "There is no privilege under section 2710.03 of
the Revised Code if a court, administrative agency, or arbitrator finds, after a hearing in
camera, that the party seeking discovery or the proponent of the evidence has shown that
the evidence is not otherwise available, that the disclosure is necessary in the particular
case to prevent a manifest injustice, and that the mediation communication is sought or
offered in either of the following: (1) A court proceeding involving a misdemeanor..."
81 UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, supra note 50, at §6(a)(1)-(7).
82 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8 (1996).
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Court's original goal to promote predictability, both horizontally and
vertically.
In Jaffee, the Supreme Court stated that "[b]ecause state legislatures are
fully aware of the need to protect the integrity of the fact-finding functions of
their courts, the existence of a consensus among the States indicates that
'reason and experience' support recognition of the privilege." The court looks
to the "reason and experience" of the States for support when recognizing the
privilege. If a consensus exists among the state courts, it should be regarded
as strong support for the federal courts to reach the same consensus.
Further, "[i]n addition, given the importance of the patient's understanding
that her communications with her therapist will not be publicly disclosed, any
state's promise of confidentiality would have little value if the patient were
aware that the privilege would not be honored in a federal court. Denial of the
federal privilege therefore would frustrate the purposes of the state legislation
that was enacted to foster these confidential communications."83 The Supreme
Court emphasized the importance of predictability across both court systems.
In the lower court, the Seventh Circuit observed that all fifty states had already
recognized some form of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 8 The federal
court's refusal to recognize a federal privilege frustrated the purpose and
functionality of the existing state uniformity.
For example, imagine one district court in State A created a two-part
balancing test and subsequently decided to recognize a privilege for
communications made inside a company board meeting, but another district
court in State A created a five-part balancing test and subsequently decided
not to recognize a privilege for company board meeting communications.
Then, imagine that several board members in State A decided to sue the rest
of the board members for defamation. If half of the board members were from
one district in State A and the other half were from the other district, there
would undoubtedly be confusion throughout the litigation as to whether the
communications are privileged. This would frustrate those hypothetical
proceedings right from the start, such as the scope of discovery and permitted
defenses or counter-claims. To create further difficulties, the circuit courts
would likely be forced to certify and decide conflicts among those districts,
which would lead to even more inconsistent outcomes.
While that scenario is hypothetical, the inconsistent tests established by
lower courts were one of the very real problems that the Supreme Court sought
to avoid by establishing the Jaffee balancing test. The Court articulated their
goal by saying that the unpredictable scope of protection resulting from such
a variety of legal balancing tests would "eviscerate the effectiveness of the
83 _d.
4 Id.
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privilege" entirely. 85 By refusing to allow the lower courts to establish their
own balancing tests for privileges, the Supreme Court manifested their interest
in promoting the predictability of a privilege's protection. The Supreme Court
advocated for predictability, not balancing tests. However, the Court
proceeded to contradict their strong initial interest in predictability by using
the Jaffee case to establish a balancing test for privileges.
This paradox reflects the Supreme Court's view that lower courts should
not use any arbitrary method of their choosing, but instead should use only the
Jaffee balancing test to recognize new privileges. 86 This interpretation
promotes the Court's strong interest in predictability because the same
balancing test is consistently used to enact privileges. It also promotes the
Court's interest in remaining consistent with Congress's intent for a flexible
rule, because courts should evolve as society changes and weigh the factors
"in light of reason and experience" as required by Rule 501.87 In the context
of a mediation privilege, the same unpredictability exists among the federal
courts and extends negative effects onto the state level. The federal courts'
refusal to recognize a mediation privilege is frustrating the rapidly increasing
consistency among state courts.
In sum, federal courts should weigh the first two factors against the third
factor and easily find that the left side of the scales far outweighs the right
side, and therefore a privilege should be recognized. Because the courts should
conclude that a mediation privilege overcomes the necessary "burden," no
inquiry into the fourth factor is necessary. For the sake of reinforcing the
Court's original goal of vertical and horizontal predictability as it applies to a
federal mediation privilege, courts should account for the fourth factor and
determine that a privilege should not be denied.
IV. CURRENT UNPREDICTABLE INCONSISTENCIES AMONG FEDERAL
COURTS WHEN RECOGNIZING OR DENYING PRIVILEGES SIMILAR TO A
MEDIATION PRIVILEGE
A chronological analysis of cases that followed Jaffee shows the extent of
the inconsistent approaches to a federal mediation privilege. Although federal
courts generally agree that confidentiality is essential to successful
85 Id. The Seventh Circuit previously used a balancing test in the lower Jaffee decision.
86 Id.
87 Congress borrowed this phrase from a 1934 Supreme Court opinion, Wolfle v.
United States, 291 U.S. 7, 12 (1934).
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settlements, 88 the interest in ensuring accurate judicial fact-finding often
outweighs the public and private interests in reaching settlements. The various
applications of the Jaffee balancing test to settlement discussions show the
different weight that different federal courts give to each factor.
A. Federal Courts That Have Successfully Used the Jaffee Balancing
Test to Recognize a Mediation Privilege or Other Similar Protection
The Ninth Circuit was one of the first federal courts to protect mediation
communications, even though the court did not specifically define the
protection as an evidentiary "privilege."8 9 In NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc.,
the court recognized that the public perception of mediator neutrality would
be destroyed if mediator testimony were admissible in subsequent court
proceedings.9" This would undermine the whole mediation process, therefore
such testimony should be inadmissible.9' The Ninth Circuit concluded that the
protection promoted the public interest--"maintaining the perceived and
actual impartiality of federal mediators does outweigh the benefits
derivable" 2 from permitting the mediator testimony, which is parallel to the
interest promoted by the second Jaffee factor.93 At least two other courts have
88 Judy Shopp, Mediation: Confidentiality and Privilege, Penn. Bar Association
Quarterly, July 2010, available at
http://www.ogc.pa.gov/Services%20to%20Agencies/Mediation%20Procedures/Documen
ts/PABAR%20Shopp%2ONew%2OCx%20Article.pdf ("Most courts are understanding of
the mediation process and respectful of the need to keep the process confidential, and by
and large mediators and the programs and organizations that support mediation have been
successful at keeping mediators out of court proceedings, especially within the Third
Circuit.").
89 NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51, 52-53 (9th Cir. 1980). See also Lake
Utopia Paper Limited v. Connelly Containers, Inc., 608 F.2d 928 (C.A.N.Y. 1979), in
which the court discussed the need for confidentiality in different ADR procedures,
reasoning that a pre-trial conference was somewhat regarded as confidential.
9 NLRB, 618 F.2d at 52-53.
91 Id. at 55. ("If conciliators were permitted or required to testify about their activities,
or if the production of notes or reports of their activities could be required, not even the
strictest adherence to purely factual matters would prevent the evidence from favoring or
seeming to favor one side or the other. The inevitable result would be that the usefulness
of the [FMCS] in the settlement of future disputes would be seriously impaired, if not
destroyed.").
92Id. at 54.
13 Id. Ironically, the Ninth Circuit does not reference the Macaluso opinion and does
not cite to Jaffee at all.
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extended the Macaluso holding to unambiguously result in the definition of a
federal mediation privilege.94
Almost twenty years after the Ninth Circuit issued the Macaluso decision,
Congress enacted the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 (the "ADR
Act") to govern federal mediations. 95 The ADR Act instructed the federal
district courts to create alternative dispute resolution procedures for all civil
court proceedings.96 This instruction included a requirement that the courts
create and implement some procedure for mediation confidentiality. 9'
Seemingly a step towards confidentiality uniformity, the overwhelming
majority of courts have interpreted the ADR Act only to be a broad instruction
to address mediation confidentiality in some form and not as a specific
instruction to implement a privilege. 98 These courts reason that Congress
rejected the nine specific privileges originally proposed and therefore did not
intend for the ADR Act to explicitly create any ADR privilege. 99 Despite this
interpretation, the ADR Act successfully manifested Congress's view that
confidentiality is essential to the success of mediation and that mediation
communications ought to be protected, to some extent, from future
disclosures. '00 The ADR Act also provided congressional recognition that
mediation is an increasingly popular dispute resolution method requiring
recognized and predictable confidentiality.' This provides additional support
9' City of Port Arthur v. United States, 517 F. Supp. 987, 1002-03 & n.105 (D.D.C.
1981), judgment affd, 459 U.S. 159 (1982) (the court cited the Macaluso holding when
permitting the mediator to refuse to testify). See also Mack Truck v. United Auto Workers,
Misc. Action No. 87-265 (D.D.C. Aug 11, 1987) (the court cited the public need for the
assurance of confidentiality was more important than the parties' need for the mediator
testimony, but the mediator was permitted to testify about statements made to the public).
" Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, 28 U.S.C. § 651-58 (1998). Although the
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 (ADRA) provides an explicit federal
mediation privilege when a federal agency is a party.
96 Id.
9 Id. It only instructed the courts to "provide for confidentiality of the alternative
dispute resolution process and to prohibit disclosure of confidential dispute resolution
communications." 28 U.S.C. § 652(d).
98 See Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1123 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
(finding that because Congress had previously played a major role in the language of
Federal Rule of Evidence 501, they most likely did not also intend to create a specific
mediation privilege by enacting the specific confidentiality portions of the Alternative
Dispute Resolution Act).
99 Id. Those courts turn to 28 U.S.C. § 652(d), which states that the ADR Act does not
define confidentiality or the scope that Congress intended for mediation confidentiality.
100 Charles W. Ehrhardt, Confidentiality, Privilege and Rule 408: The Protection of
Mediation Proceedings in Federal Court, 60 LA. L. REV. 91 (1999-2000).
101 Id.
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for the federal courts' use of the Jaffee balancing test to enact a federal
mediation privilege.
Over twenty years after the Ninth Circuit recognized the protection in
Macaluso, the Sixth Circuit recognized a protection for mediation
communications, although the mechanism used was Federal Rule of Evidence
408, not Rule 501.102 In Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power
Supply, °3 the court did not explicitly address a mediation privilege, but instead
used Federal Rule of Evidence 408 and adopted an expansive privilege for
settlements using the same reasoning from Jaffee. 10 4 The Goodyear decision
illustrates the strong weight that should be given to the public's interest in
limiting additional unnecessary litigation. It also illustrated the lack of weight
given to the interest in judicial truth-seeking, as the court remained relatively
unconcerned about the risk of excluding any otherwise admissible evidence.'
The Sixth Circuit's interpretation of these two competing interests shows how
federal courts can also balance these interests in favor of a federal mediation
privilege under Rule 501.
Following Rule 501 instead of the Sixth Circuit's path under Rule 408,
federal courts in both California and Pennsylvania successfully used the Jaffee
balancing test to expand the protection afforded to mediator testimony, which
was previously defined by Macaluso. °6 Both courts extended the protection
by defining a mediation privilege that also applies to participants.'
0 7
In Folb v. Motion Pictures Industry Pension & Health Plans, the Ninth
Circuit revisited the issue they had previously decided and recognized a
federal mediation privilege, separate from any similar state privilege, by
blocking the discovery of documents previously prepared for a mediation
between two employees, one of which had been accused of sexual
harassment. 108 The court cited its previous decision in Macaluso and
concluded that the interest in blocking mediator testimony and the interest in
102 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 976, 979 (6th
Cir. 2003).
103 Id. at 979-80 (stating that this privilege included those communications regarding
the settlement itself, which prevented them from being admitted into evidence).
1
Id.
5 Id. (stating that although this could be because the parties reached a settlement
regarding the communications in question, such a loss of evidence may not have been
important).
"o Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1178; Sheldone v. Pa. Tpk. Comm'n, 104 F. Supp. 2d
511, 514 (W.D. Pa. 2000).107 Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1178; Sheldone, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 514.
108 Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1178 (noting that, with regard to the criminal nature of the
accusations, the privilege "may be attenuated of necessity in criminal or quasi-criminal
cases where the defendant's constitutional rights are at stake").
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keeping mediation communications confidential serve the "same ultimate
purpose: encouraging parties to attend mediation and communicate openly and
honestly in order to facilitate successful alternative dispute resolution."'109 The
court used the Jaffee balancing test to establish this mediation privilege, even
though they left the parameters of the privilege relatively undefined.' By
leaving the parameters of the privilege undefined, the Folb court side-stepped
the issue of the applicability of the privilege to future mediations and their
unique factual settings. Therefore, although the court expanded the privilege,
the uncertain applicability is still problematic for promoting predictability.
The Western District of Pennsylvania followed the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning and expanded the Folb privilege."' In Sheldone v. Pennsylvania
Turnpike Commission, the court recognized a privilege for mediation
communications and documents in a Fair Labor Standards Act case, by
meticulously analyzing each Jaffee factor, just as previously done by the Folb
court." 2 First, the court cited the ADR Act of 1998 as overwhelming evidence
that a mediation privilege was essential to promote settlements through the
establishment of a trusting environment." 3 Second, the court recognized that
a mediation privilege serves the public's interest in promoting settlements to
decrease court dockets and costs. "4 Third, the court determined that any
evidence lost would not exceed a "modest" amount, reasoning that the
opposing party's burden to discover information without using the privileged
mediation communications was not unreasonable. 15 Finally, the court
explicitly stated that the federal court's failure to adopt the privilege would
" Id. at 1172. See also NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51, 56 (9th Cir.
1980).
"0 Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d. at 1179-80 (Stating the mediation privilege parameters must
be "fleshed out over time" and that it would not consider waiver and exception issues.
However, the court did define "mediation" because of the timeline of when the statements
were made in relation to the actual mediation. The Ninth Circuit established that the
privilege protected communications between parties or with the mediator that were made
during or in preparation for a formal mediation session. Additionally, the Folb court did
not want to venture into FRE 408 territory, reasoning that all communications after the
mediation session were not privileged under their established mediation privilege). See
also Deason, supra note 3 at 97-100 (discussing the problems associated with the
ambiguously defined privilege).
.. Sheldone, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 515-16. See also Deason, supra note 3 at 37, (stating
that the coverage for communications "in connection with" a mediation is potentially
broader than that of the Folb privilege, in that it might include communications following
the close of a mediation session).
112 Sheldone, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 512-18.
'3 1d. at 513-14.
114Id. at 514.
11 Id. at 515.
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undermine the states' consistency. 116 At least one other court has cited
Sheldone extensively to recognize a federal mediation privilege,117 while also
adding to the public interest by emphasizing the importance in encouraging
alternative dispute resolution processes to promote more efficient litigation." 8
The Ninth Circuit's decisions in Macaluso and then in Folb established
protections for mediation communications by using a balancing test similar to
Jaffee. Although neither of those decisions, nor the Sheldone decision, were
adopted uniformly, they began the important discussion about a predictable
federal mediation privilege, separate from state mediation privileges. All
federal courts should follow the foundation established by those decisions and
use the Jaffee balancing test to recognize a federal common law mediation
privilege under Rule 501. The federal courts that have rigidly refused to
recognize a federal common law mediation privilege rely on reasoning which
contradicts Jaffee and the congressional intent accompanying Rule 501.
Therefore, when determining whether to recognize a mediation privilege,
federal courts should use their "reason and experience" to avoid similar
contradictory decisions that result in unpredictable protections.
B. Federal Courts That Have Refused to Recognize a Mediation
Privilege or Have Avoided Deciding the Issue of a Mediation
Privilege
Some federal courts refuse to recognize a federal common law mediation
privilege under Rule 501, while others simply avoid addressing the issue
entirely." 9 The problems caused by this additional divide among the federal
courts is exemplified by returning to the Central District of California, the
court that originally decided Folb.2 ° In Molina v. Lexmark International, Inc.,
116 Id at 515-18 (stating that all of the states except Delaware had a mediation
confidentiality statute).
117 1n re RDM Sports Grp., Inc., 277 B.R. 415, 431 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2002) (stating
that documents prepared in advance of the mediation but not specifically for the purpose
of the mediation did not qualify for the privilege).
18 1d at 427-28.
19 See generally Solorzano v. Shell Chem. Co., No. CIV.A.99-2831, 2000 WL
1145766 (E.D. La. Aug. 14, 2000) (Holding that no federal privilege existed to protect an
ombudsman's records. Both the Louisiana district court and the Eighth Circuit decision
which it relied on acknowledged the strong presumption against creating federal privileges,
and both courts concluded that it was not overcome in either case, while also concluding
that no evidence existed showing that a lack of a privilege would hinder the ombudsman's
ability to solve workplace disputes or his coworker's perception of his neutrality.).
120 See generally Molina v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., No. CV08-04796 MMM (FMx), 2008
WL 4447678 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2008).
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the court scrutinized their previous establishment of a mediation privilege, by
stating that the Folb holding must be limited to its facts. 121 This limited
application of the privilege frustrates any predictability that it otherwise may
have established. The Molina court then questioned the existence of a federal
common law mediation privilege by making the distinction that mediation
communications are "confidential" but are not "privileged" under either Rule
501 or Federal Rule of Evidence 408.122 This vague stance is unhelpful in
establishing the privilege's parameters, which were already ambiguous from
the Folb decision. In order to achieve any amount of predictability, federal
courts must establish clear parameters for a common law federal mediation
privilege.
The Fifth Circuit took an even more rigid stance in denying a mediation
privilege in In re Grand Jury Subpoena. 123 The court refused to recognize a
federal common law privilege for mediation communications, despite the
general acceptance of confidentiality's important role in the success of
mediation, reasoning that privileges should only be created when there is clear
congressional manifestation of intent to create such a privilege. 124 This
reasoning is inconsistent with the enactment of Rule 501 because Congress
chose to defer to the courts' "reason and experience" for recognizing
privileges, they eliminated any requirement of their specific intent for enacting
such privileges. 25 The closest thing to congressional intent to explicitly create
a mediation privilege is the enactment of the ADR Act, in which courts are
only required to address mediation confidentiality in some form. The Fifth
Circuit does not use any reason or experience when denying the mediation
privilege, but instead creates a confusing precedent that would likely be
overturned if it reached the Supreme Court. Therefore, federal courts should
not follow this reasoning and should instead return to the cases previously
addressed to find justification and the foundation for recognizing a federal
mediation privilege.
Other federal courts have refused to address the issue of whether a federal
common law mediation privilege exists under Rule 501.126 For example, the
121 Id. at *13.
122 Id. at "9-1 1.
123 See generally In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Dec. 17, 1996, 148 F.3d 487 (5th
Cir. 1998).
124 Id. at 492.
125 Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, supra note 8, at 7.
126 Babsasa v. LensCrafters, Inc., 498 F. 3d 972,972 (9th Cir. 2007). The general issue
was whether a letter that was prepared for a mediation, and therefore protected by
California's rules of evidence, was admissible for the purpose of determining removal
jurisdiction.
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Ninth Circuit that previously established the Folb privilege once again refused
to decide the issue in a more recent case.127 In Babsasa v. LensCrafters, Inc.,
the court avoided the issue of federal mediation confidentiality by narrowly
concluding that it was irrelevant whether a state privilege applied, because
amount-in-controversy issues are governed by federal law.'28 Therefore, under
Rule 501, the applicability of a California mediation privilege was
irrelevant. 129 Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit stated in a footnote that
LensCrafters failed to raise the argument that the letter was privileged under
federal law or a common law privilege.13 Because LensCrafters was likely
unaware of the extent of the previously established privilege from Folb, they
failed to raise an issue that may otherwise have been successful, so the Court
refused to consider it. 131 This provides further evidence that the
inconsistencies among any recognized federal mediation privileges cause
unpredictability for litigants that must be corrected.
Federal courts have generally exercised restraint when considering new
common law privileges in all contexts, citing the Supreme Court's conclusion
that privileges "must be strictly construed and accepted only to the very limited
extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a
public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all
rational means for ascertaining truth." '32 However, federal courts should
return to the congressional intent accompanying Rule 501, which established
that privileges should evolve alongside society. Congress did not issue
mandates regarding specific privileges, but instead intended for courts to make
determinations "in the light of reason and experience."133 Therefore, the
federal courts should view the evidence of society's increasing interest in the
success of mediation as a signal that the time has come to recognize a federal
mediation privilege.
127 Id. at 972.
1 81 Id. at 972.
129 Id. at 975 ("Thus, even if the California mediation privilege applied to the
Bruinsma letter, which we do not decide, it would not preclude a determination that the
Bruinsma letter constituted § 1446(b) notice for purposes of removal to federal court.")
130 Id. at 975 n.1.
131 Id. at 975.
132 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (quoting Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
"'3 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1,2 (1996).
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V. PROPOSAL FOR PROMOTING PREDICTABILITY USING THE JAFFEE
BALANCING TEST AND THE POSITIVE EFFECT ON THE SUCCESS OF
MEDIATION
The unpredictability caused by the federal courts' inconsistent approaches
to a federal mediation privilege jeopardizes the ability of mediation to be a
successful dispute resolution method. Predictability is essential to a successful
privilege, but the current federal approach does nothing to promote it at the
federal or state level. The Supreme Court affirmed the importance of
predictability among the state and federal courts in Jaffee by saying that
"[parties] must be able to predict with some degree of certainly whether
particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which
purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts,
is little better than no privilege at all."' 34 Although complete predictability is
unrealistic, federal courts must begin to take steps towards some level of
uniformity.
The uncertainty of the federal mediation privilege causes a variety of
applications among the lower courts, which is hardly better than no privilege
at all. The unpredictable federal mediation confidentiality also frustrates the
benefit of the growing uniformity at the state level.'35 Mediation participants
cannot confidently predict the extent to which their statements will be
protected if their dispute moves between the state and federal levels, so any
state uniformity is useless.' 36 Parties that are not sure about the extent of
confidentiality for their statements will not negotiate in good faith or make full
disclosures, which makes a settlement nearly impossible.'37 When mediation
does not promote settlements, it undermines the private and public interests
served by mediation.' 38
114Id. at 18.
.3 Uniform Law Commission (2016),
http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Mediation%2OAct.
136 Uncertainty exists in litigation, regardless of the area of law, causing some
difficulty in predicting the law that will govern litigation after mediation. This normal
uncertainty increases with the lack of consistent state and federal privileges. Deason, supra
note 3, at 280 (describing these uncertainties involve three basic layers: the variety of
confidentiality protections, the variety in choice-of-law analysis, and the competing and
multiple interests at stake in the specific litigation).
' See generally FISHER & URY, supra note 4.
138 See generally Scott Hughes, The Uniform Mediation Act: To the Spoiled Go the
Privileges, 85 MARQ. L. REv. 9 (2001).
320
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Notably, the Supreme Court has turned to state law in determining the
existence of privileges more than any other area of evidence law. 3 9 This
shows the persuasiveness of the states' recognition of privileges on the federal
courts, both in substance and the need for predictability.' q When adopting a
federal mediation privilege, the federal courts should look the states' adoption
of the UMA and follow their exceptions to the privilege.' 4 ' This would further
promote predictability and mediation participants could accurately predict the
extent of confidentiality and the applicable exceptions. It is an unrealistic goal
to expect that federal courts will ever unanimously adopt the Uniform
Mediation Act, but this does not mean some amount of uniformity cannot be
achieved.
One problem presented by the above cases is the inapplicability of an
established and recognized privilege to different facts, because of the narrow
holdings. As mediation continues to expand across jurisdictions, the need
increases for a privilege that is applicable to different situations.'42 The Ninth
Circuit in Folb established a broad privilege, but then later determined that it
only applied to the specific facts of that case. This holding is unhelpful for any
future litigants seeking to persuade a federal court to recognize a mediation
privilege because of its inapplicability to other factual settings. Multiple courts
have established that a privilege exists under the specific case facts, but they
fail to define the parameters that could potentially apply to other situations.
This leaves future courts without an established and applicable privilege and
leaves the private parties unable to predict how their statements are protected.
Federal courts should use their "reason and experience" along with the Jaffee
factors as applied to similar situations to establish clear parameters of a
mediation privilege under Rule 501.
139 PAUL C. GIANNELLI, UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE 575-78 (2009).
14 Fred Zacharias, Harmonizing Privilege and Confidentiality, 41 S. TEx. L. REV. 69,
77 (1999).
141 Uniform Mediation Act §6(a)(1)-(7) provides the exceptions to the privilege. See,
e.g., Ohio R.C. § 2710.05(B)(1). (Section language states "There is no privilege under
section 2710.03 of the Revised Code if a court, administrative agency, or arbitrator finds,
after a hearing in camera, that the party seeking discovery or the proponent of the evidence
has shown that the evidence is not otherwise available, that the disclosure is necessary in
the particular case to prevent a manifest injustice, and that the mediation communication
is sought or offered in either of the following: (1) A court proceeding involving a
misdemeanor...")
142 Uniform Mediation Act, Prefatory Note (2001) ("Mediation sessions are
increasingly conducted by conference calls between mediators and parties in different
states and even over the Internet.").
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VI. CONCLUSION
The various inconsistent approaches to federal common law privileges are
undermining the ability of mediation to grow as a successful method of
alternative dispute resolution. The resulting unpredictability is the exact
problem the Supreme Court corrected in Jaffee v. Redmond by enacting a
balancing test for courts to use with their "reason and experience" when
recognizing new privileges.
143
Jaffee applied a balancing test to recognize a psychotherapist-patient
privilege and held that a privilege would not be recognized if"in the interests
of justice, the evidentiary need for the disclosure of the contents of a patient's
counseling sessions outweighs that patient's privacy interests."' 44 If the first
Jaffee factors, which require the privilege to benefit a private and public
interest, sufficiently outweigh the third factor,141 the court should recognize
the privilege. If the first two factors do not sufficiently outweigh the third
factor, then the court should proceed to consider the fourth factor before
determining that the privilege should be denied.
In the context of a mediation privilege, the federal courts should give
weight to the first two factors that exceedingly outweighs the third factor. A
mediation privilege would likely cause only a minimal loss of evidence,
because the information sought could be independently discoverable.' 46 The
fourth Jaffee factor that represents the procedural interest in predictability also
provides justification for a federal mediation privilege. 147 No analysis of the
fourth factor is necessary at that point because courts should not be considering
denying the privilege. The fourth factor only strengthens the reasons to
recognize a mediation privilege because many state legislatures, recognizing
143 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518,U.S. 1, 2 (1996) (quoting Trammel v. United States,
445 U.S. 40, 47, 100 S.Ct. 906 (1980) ( Rule 501 "did not freeze the law governing the
privileges of witnesses in federal trials at a particular point in our history, but rather
directed federal courts to 'continue the evolutionary development of testimonial
privileges").
'" Id. The Jaffee Court's paradoxical stance about balancing tests should not
interpreted to mean that the Court disfavors using the balancing test to recognize new
privileges, but instead should be interpreted as a manifestation of Congress's intention for
Rule 501 to be flexible and evolving along with society.
145 Id.
46 Widman, supra note 56.
147 See Jaffee, 518 U.S. I at 2.
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the important role of confidentiality in mediation, have moved towards
consistency by adopting the mediation privilege contained in the UMA. 48
The UMA itself provides support for enacting a privilege, because it was
created for the very purpose of establishing consistency and creating public
confidence in the use of voluntary mediation. 49 Despite this clear direction
and applicability of the Jaffee balancing test to a federal mediation privilege,
federal courts have not consistently recognized a federal common law
mediation privilege under Rule 501, thus undermining each one of the interests
promoted by Jaffee. The federal courts should correct this damaging trend by
using their "reason and experience"' 50 to balance the four Jaffee factors and
make progress towards uniformly recognizing a federal mediation privilege
under Rule 501.
148 Kimberly Taylor, Mediation: Confidentiality and Enforceability, LAW.COM (Apr.
6, 2015), http://www.law.com/sites/kimberlytaylor/2015/04/06/mediation-confidentiality-
and-enforceability/?slreturn=20170119165737.
As of 2015, twelve states have enacted the UMA, and two more plan to introduce a
similar Bill this year.
14 91 d. (Saying that the UMA "will further the goals of alternative dispute resolution
by promoting candor of the parties by fostering prompt, economical, and amicable
resolution of disputes, by retaining decision making authority with the parties, and by
promoting predictability with regard to the process and the level of confidentiality that can
be expected by participants.").
"' Fed. R. Evid. 501.
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